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Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, appellant in the first two cases above named, and respondent
in the third case above named, respectively petitions
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for a rehearing in e,ach of the above entitled cases, and
as grounds for rehearing represents and shows:
1. That this court, in deciding the cases, misunderstood or misconceived some of the essential facts, as
a result of which, the court's decision is based on a
misapprehension of certain fundamental facts.
2. In deciding the case, the court proceeded on an
erroneous theory, based in part, on a misunderstanding
of the facts.
3. The court failed to consider the principal contention asserted by the Hartford for reversal of the
judgments below.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING
POINT I.
THAT THIS COURT, IN DECIDING THE CASES, MISUNDERSTOOD OR MISCONCEIVED SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS, AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE COURT'S
DECISION IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL FACTS.

The factual background out of which these three
cases arises is extremely complicated, and although there
are no large areas of dispute in the record, there have
been some conflicting claims of counsel as to what the
record shows, as a result of which we feel that the court
has been mislead and drawn into making certain assumptions of fact, believing that there was a conflict in the
evidence, when in fact there was none. We therefore feel
constrained to call to the court's .attention certain matters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which are of importance to the ultimate decision of the
cases.
1. The court's opinion recites' as follows:
"Soon after operations commenced the project ran into difficulties largely because this
'straight line' system did not accommodate itself
to the sales program, either in sequence of construction or in amount." (Emphasis ours)
We believe that it would be more correct to say,
that Felt's sales program did not accommodate itself
to Cassady's construction program. There is nothing
in any contract, and we challenge counsel for any of
the parties to call to the attention of the court any contractual provision, which required Cassady to accommodate himself to Felt's sales program. His commitment
was to "supervise, co-ordinate and procure" the construction of 100 homes on contiguous lots. He was entitled to be paid for his work performed, according to
the exact stage of construction of each home, at two
week intervals, with no qualification whatsoever, as to
whether the home was sold or not sold. Felt specifically
admitted this in its own brief, page 23.
2. The court also says:
"Cassady's funds gradually became tied up
in homes upon which he could not receive loan
proceeds so he was unable to pay his help and
material suppliers."
It would be more correct to say that because Felt
failed to pay Cassady the course of construction pay-
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ments provided in the primary construction contract, and
also in the disbursal agreement, Cassady was unable to
•p,ay his help and material suppliers. It was well known
by all parties to the agreement, that Cassady had no
substantial capital, and that he relied on course of construction payments to keep the project moving. Practically every witness who took the stand admitted that
course of consruction payments were never made timely.
(T. 62, 64, 65, 67, 235, 236, 258, 262, 321, 347), and Felt
itself specifically admitted this to be the fact in its own
brief on appeal. (Felt brief, pp. 22, 23). This court apparently also recognized this to be true in stating that
"homes nearly completed often wanted for purchasers . . . " Elsewhere this court said:
"While it may seem that the only practical
way Cassady could have operated would have
been to get money on each house as construction
progressed, whether it had been sold or not, the
fact is that the contract did not so require."
The exact opposite is true. F o r the convenience of
the Court we quote the relevant portion of paragraph
23 of the construction contract:
" T h e foregoing schedule is to be used as a
general guide. However, it is agreed that disbursements will be made to second party and the
subcontractors in accordance with the actual stage
of completion of each dwelling within five days
after the inspections are made" (Emphasis ours.)
Essentially the same provision was included in the
disbursal agreement, (Ex. Pr. 8, paragraph 5, together
with Ex. B. thereof. These provisions were never changed
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by any subsequent agreement including the supplemental
agreement of February 16, 1951.
Cassady was therefore, entitled to rely on course of
construction payments as provided in the contracts, without reference to Felt's sales program. To say that he
failed to accommodate himself to Felt's sales program
is to cast upon him, by innuendo, a duty which he never
contracted to undertake, and to deprive him of rights
which he specifically contracted to receive.
3. The court states that Prudential Savings was
authorized under the supplemental agreement to withhold progress payments until corrections were made so
that construction would meet V. A. inspections, and that
Prudential Savings "was given sole discretion to pay
out the funds in such manner ,as in their judgment would
expeditiously move the project forward to completion."
There was, however, a qualification to this also. It was
specifically provided in the supplemental agreement as
follows:
" I n no event, however, shall the payments
be less than those prescribed in this paragraph
23 [of the Construction Contract] prior to this
amendment."
In short, Cassady ?s right to course of construction
payments in accordance with the exact stage of completion as guaranteed in his original agreement with Felt
was specifically preserved in detail in the disbursing
agreement, and was likewise expressly and specifically
preserved intact in the supplemental agreement, and was
never altered, modified, rescinded or abrogated by any
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agreement between the parties, oral or written, at any
time during the course of the work.
4. It is stated in the court's opinion that Cassady
had made no complaint against Felt up to the time of
the supplemental agreement. The exact opposite is true.
Exs. H-32, 33, 34, consist of a sheaf of letters of protest
written by Cassady to Felt, Prudential Federal and
Accountants, complaining of the failure to make timely
progress payments and pointing out the difficulties accruing to Cassady as a result thereof. Cassady repeatedly
protested, both orally and in writing, the failure of
Felt to make progress payments timely. This also is
without dispute.
5.
lows :

The opinion of the court further recites as fol-

" T h e trial court found that Hartford did
become a party to the supplemental contract by
giving its approval to the modifications of the
portions of the original contract which it desired
to have modified without expressly limiting its
agreement to the other parts of the supplemental
agreement."
The exact language of the Hartford's concurrence
in the supplemental agreement is as follows:
" H A R T F O R D ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, as surety on the bond of CASSADY COMPANY, INC., does hereby consent to
amended paragraphs 22 and 23, and 7 of the Construction contract in connection with which its
bond has been given." (Pr-6). (Emphasis ours.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This likewise is without dispute. There is no question of making a proper finding of fact. If there is any
issue, it is an issue of law to determine the correct interpretation of this language. However, in view of the fact
that the Hartford refused to sign the contract generally,
and that by the express language of its endorsement it
limited its consent to .amended paragraphs 22, 23 and 7
of the construction contract, we do not see upon what
basis it can be held that it concurred in any modification
of any other agreement. Nor does Prudential Federal
contend to the contrary. In fact, it specifically admits,
,at page 25 of its brief, that " Hartford placed a limited
approval" on the supplemental agreement, and "it endorsed its consent to only the changes in that construction contract."
6. The Court further recites as follows:
"Furthermore, Hartford seemed perfectly
willing, and did accept the benefits of the extension of time, the increase in price per house and
of disbursement prior to V. A. approval for their
principal Cassady."
The extension of time may have been something of
a benefit to the Hartford, but also it was something of
a liability, since it extended the Hartford's obligation
under its bond. Had the Hartford refused to concur in
the extension, it could have stepped in at the time of
the supplemental contract, and completed the project
at its own expense which the evidence shows without
dispute would have been substantially less than the
amount for which it has been held liable in the court
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below. Although it is alleged in the brief of Prudential
Federal, that there was an increase in the price per
house to Cassady ,a comparison of the original construction contract with the supplemental agreement will show
that this is not so. The only difference w,as that the
number of houses of different types was changed somewhat but there was no change whatsoever in the unit
cost of houses, and there was no substantial increase
in the remuneration to be received by Cassady. Neither
w,as there any added benefit to the Hartford by reason
of a provision for disbursement, prior to V. A. approval,
since such could be and was done under the original
agreement. In short, Hartford got no benefits whatsoever from the supplemental agreement, and merely consented to the extension of time to give the parties an
opportunity to work out their own salvation.
7. While it is true, as observed by the court, that
knowledge of Cassady's limited finances is partly what
prompted the parties to insist that he procure a performance bond, the same knowledge, no doubt prompted the
Hartford to insist, as ,a provision in the bond, that Cassady be timely paid for the work performed. Quite obviously, if he were not paid for the work performed
in accordance with the provisions of the construction
contract the project was foredoomed to failure.
In summary, the court has apparently taken the
view that Cassady was bound to accommodate his construction schedule to the sales program of Felt, and that
by failing to do so, he in some fashion breached a duty
(of unknown origin), resulting in the failure of the pro-
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ject. The exact opposite is true. Cassady had no obligation to conform to the Felt sales program, but was
entitled as a matter of absolute contract right, as set
forth in every agreement to which he was a party, to
be paid in accordance with the exact stage of construction of each individual unit without any reference whatsoever to whether it was sold or not. The evidence was
without dispute that Felt breached its contract obligations, as it has itself admitted in its brief, that by reason
thereof Cassady got into difficulties that proved to be
inextricable, and as a result of which the project failed.
POINT II.
IN DECIDING THE CASE, THE COURT PROCEEDED
ON AN ERRONEOUS THEORY, BASED IN PART, ON A
MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FACTS.
POINT III.
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRINCIPAL
CONTENTION ASSERTED BY THE HARTFORD FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS BELOW.

It appears to us that the court has lost sight of the
principal contention advanced by the Hartford for reversal of the judgments below. It has decided the cases
essentially on a theory of causation, analogous to that
doctrine as it exists in the law of torts. In its opinion
the court states that it is the "Harford's contention
that Cassady's failure to perform was in reality caused
by various breaches by plaintiffs," (emphasis ours), etc.
And in concluding that phase of its decision, the court
says, "that it was not unreasonable for the trial court
to refuse to make the finding contended for by defend-
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ants, that the cause of Cassady's failure was breaches
by Felt/7 (emphasis ours.), etc., "and/or Prudential."
This approach wholly fails to take into account the
real claim of the Hartford in this matter. That claim
was set forth in detail under Point V in our original
brief. The failure to appreciate its significance may have
resulted from the fact that it was one of the later points
argued in our brief. However, so that there may now be
no misunderstanding whatsoever, as to our position, we
set forth the following:
As we believe we have demonstrated under Point I
hereof, Gassady was entitled to course of construction
payments in accordance with the exact stage of completion of each unit, and at approximately fortnightly intervals, and this right was guaranteed to him, not only
by the construction contract, but also by the disbursal
agreement, and was preserved inviolate in the supplemental agreement. The Hartford's bond, specifically
provided as follows:
"The SURETY shall not be liable under the
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, unless
the Obligees, or either of them, shall m,ake payment to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compliance with the terms of said contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations
to be performed by each obligee under said contract at the time and in the manner therein set
forth." (Emphasis ours.)
This language provided, in clear and unmistakable
terms, that the obligees should make payment to the
principal in treasonable compliance ivith the terms of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the contract as to payments, and perform all other obligations to be performed by the several obligees in the
time, and in the manner, set forth in their contractual
obligations. Since it is without dispute that Felt was
never relieved by contract from its obligation to make
course of construction payments to Cassady, and since
the record shows without dispute that course of construction payments were never timely made, the truly
crucial issue in this case is whether the above language
defeats the rights of Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company and Prudential Federal. As we see it, there can
be no question that it defeats the rights of Felt.
The foregoing provision of the bond was quoted in
our brief in two separate places, pages 11 and 44. It
was recognized by Prudential Federal as the crucial
issue in its case and was quoted in its brief in no less
than four different places, (pages 4, 21, 63 and 71).
It was likewise recognized by Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company as the crucial issue in its case and was
quoted at page 4 and again at page 23 of its brief.
We are disturbed that this vital provision which
apparently all the parties recognized as the crucial point
of the case, was not even mentioned in the court's opinion. We are particularly regretful, if our own placement
of the discussion of this particular point at a later
stage in our brief, mislead the court into believing that
we did not attach great significance to it. It was so
placed in our brief because we felt that the points which
preceded it, chronologically, were necessary to lay a
proper foundation for a proper discussion by us, and a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proper understanding by the court of this vital point.
Since the court has not even mentioned the point
in its opinion, we can do no better than to invite the
court's attention to our discussion of this problem under
Point V, pages 43 to 51 inclusive, of our original brief,
and to request the court, that at this time that it consider
the arguments there advanced. We can do no more here,
than to state as clearly as we know how, that the issue
is not whether the ultimate failure of the project was
caused by breaches of the plaintiffs in their contractual
obligations to Cassady, but rather whether the plaintiffs
may be permitted to recover in the face of the language
of the bond expressly prohibiting recovery where the
plaintiffs have failed to perform their own contractual
obligations, regardless of the causative effect that these
breaches may have had in producing the ultimate result.
We also wish to direct to the attention of the court to
the case of Alhambra-Shumway
Mines vs. Alhambra Gold
Mine Corporation, (Cal. App.), 317 Pac, (2d) 649. That
case bears on our contention that Felt, having forfeited
its corporate charter to do business in the State of
Utah, has no standing to maintain this action. The case
was decided after our brief was filed and was not published in the reporter until after the case was submitted
to this court on oral arguments in January. In its decision, this court said " t h a t it. has found no case dealing
precisely with the question posed." We believe that the
case above cited is more similar in point of fact than
any of those cited in our original brief or any of those
cited in Felt's brief, or any of those cited in the opinion
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of the Court. We believe that it also has substantial
persuasive value because it is well reasoned, and of very
recent determination, The facts of that case, insofar as
material here, are stated in the court's opinion as follows:
" D u r i n g the course of the trial it was discovered that respondent, a foreign corporation,
had not paid its franchise taxes for a number of
years. Appellant thereupon moved to strike all
pleadings and evidence of respondent and to enter
the default of respondent upon the ground that
as a foreign corporation it had forfeited its right
to transact business in California, including the
right to defend this action, This motion was denied by the trial court upon the submission of
the case. The parties stipulated that ,a certificate
of suspension or forfeiture as of August 1, 1950,
from the Secretary of State might be received
in evidence. . . . Judgment in favor of respondent
was entered on August 23, 1955. On September
19, 1955, appellant filed a notice of intention to
move for a new trial and also filed a corrected
certificate of the Secretary of State reciting that
the rights of respondent corporation to transact
intrastate business were forfeited on August 1,
1950, and had not been reinstated. At the hearing
of the motion for a new trial on October 28, 1955,
respondent produced a certificate of revivor,
showing that respondent's right to do intrastate
business in California was revived and restored
to full force and effect on October 28, 1955. The
motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal
followed.''
In holding that the corporation was not entitled,
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even to defend the action, having forfeited its corporate
charter, the court said:
" I n Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery, 9 Cal.
2d 16, 68 P. 2d 968, the distinction between the
penalties under section 3669c and penalties for
failure to pay taxes levied under the Franchise
Tax Act are clearly set forth. There, the Court
said . . .:
" 'From a consideration of these statues, the
policy is clearly to prohibit the delinquent corporation from enjoying the ordinary privileges
of a going concern, in order that some pressure
will be brought to be,ar to force the payment of
taxes. * * * The statute expressly deprives the
corporation of all ' corporate powers, rights and
privileges,' subject to one exception, which is
specifically set forth, the right to amend the arti• cles to change the name. * * V
"To the same effect are Graceland v. Peebler, 50 Cal. App. 2d 545, 123 P. 2d 527 and 2
Witkin California Procedure 1013, as well as the
cases cited in Eeed v. Norman, supra. Although
the Boyle case, supra, concerned a domestic
rather than a foreign corporation, since a domestic corporation is merely suspended while a foreign corporation forfeits, the law applicable to the
lesser situation of suspension should also apply
to the more drastic penalty of forfeiture.
•Jv

"A*

*

w

w

" I n view of the provisions of section 23301
of the Eevenue and Taxation Code, and the authorities hereinbefore cited, we believe that there is
no escape from the conclusion that respondent
corporation had no right to defend in the instant
action, or even to participate therein during the
time that its corporate rights were suspended.
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Therefore the trial court should have granted
appellants' motion to strike the pleadings of respondent and certainly the trial court had no right
to consider the defenses of the statute of limitations, laches, and estoppel which respondent set
up in its answers. Section 23301 expressly deprived respondent corporation of all "corporate
powers, rights and privileges," and the right to
defend against an action is included in such power,
rights and privileges. It is true that in the imstant
case the point was not raised by appellants until
the final day of the trial and long after the action
was commenced, but that does not aid respondent
because the fact remains that the powers, rights
and privileges of respondent corporation were not
revived and restored before the entry of the judgment appealed from.
<<* # # rpj^ r e S p 0 n ( i e n t corporation having
forfeited its right to defend against the action or
to file any pleadings therein, the court erred in
considering the special defenses of laches, estoppel and the statute of limitations raised by respondent. Since the judgment was based upon
the court's findings in favor of respondent upon
said special defenses, the judgment in favor of
respondent corporation is clearly without support
and must be reversed." (Emphasis ours.)
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence shows
without dispute, and it is conceded by the adverse parties,
that Cassady did not receive progress payments as provided by the construction contract, and the later agreements ancillary and supplemental thereto; that by reason
thereof the Hartford is free of liability to the plaintiffs,
under the plain provisions of its bond; that Felt has no
standing to maintain this action; that in affirming the
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judgments below, the court erred; that this petition
should be granted; that the court should re-examine the
facts as disclosed by the record, and examine the contentions of the Hartford with regard to reversal, and
that the judgments below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

MOEETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
By EAY R, CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company
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